





“In	 the	 first	 place,	 we	 don’t	 like	 to	 be	 called	 ‘refugees.’	 We	 ourselves	 call	 one	 another	
‘newcomers’	 or	 ‘immigrants.’”	 Already	 here,	 in	 the	 first	 sentence	 of	 Arendt’s	 essay	 “We	
Refugees,”	does	 the	hiatus	of	 refugee	status	become	manifest.	A	divide	already	opens	up	
between	different	habits	of	reference.	Refugees	refer	to	themselves	in	one	way,	non-refugees	
refer	 to	 them	 in	another,	and	so	does	the	projected	or	desired	possibility	of	one	world	 in	























within	 and	 around	 which	 they	 have	 constructed	 stable	 patterns	 of	 existence	 through	 a	
process	 of	 foundational	 familiarisation,	 (2)	 thrown	 onto	 faraway	 shorelines,	 and/or	
compelled	to	cross	regional	borders	that	they	never	contemplated	to	cross,	and	3)	compelled	
to	 overcome	 their	 own	 resistance	 to	 relocation	 and	 re-familiarisation	 with	 their	 new	

















ensues.	 This	 re-entry	 invariably	 requires	 a	 re-commencement	 from	 scratch	 that	 must	
overcome	the	twofold	resistance	to	re-familiarisation	mentioned	above,	the	resistance	to	re-
entry	of	the	one	who	must	re-enter,	and	the	resistance	of	others	who	perceive	this	re-entry	

















The	 function	of	 these	devices	 is	 to	produce	semblances	of	 flows	and	 transitions	–	motion	
pictures,	in	other	words	–	through	purposefully	selected	registers	of	speed.	In	performing	this	
task,	digital	 reading	machines	ultimately	aim	at	nothing	but	 the	obfuscation	of	 the	hiatus	
between	every	frame	in	a	sequence	of	frames,	to	use	the	now	outdated	metaphor	of	a	pre-




























































































will	 pay	 attention	 to	 key	 themes	 in	 Arendt’s	 work.	 They	 will	 also	 lean	 on	 two	 recent	


























contends,	 is	 an	 “enlarged	 mentality”	 that	 is	 capable	 of	 considering	 matters	 of	 common	
concern	from	the	perspective	of	everyone	concerned	and	not	from	an	individual	or	isolated	
perspective.7	 This	 enlarged	 mentality	 has	 four	 basic	 characteristics:	 1)	 it	 concerns	 an	






and	 argumentative	 interest	 in	 the	 world”	 that	 subsumes	 particular	 observations	 under	
generalisations	 that	 are	 interesting	 to	 everyone	 concretely	 involved.9	 At	 stake	 in	 these	
generalisations	is	the	articulation	of	“concrete	generalisations”	that	are	situated	in	contexts	
of	 common	 concerns.	 This	 situated	 or	 contextual	 character	 of	 the	 generalisations	 that	
interpretive	integration	produces,	distinguishes	them	from	the	context-free	universals	that	
Kant’s	 practical	 philosophy	 contemplated.10	 The	 second	 element,	 self-localisation,	 derives	





turns	 the	 randomly	 scattered	 looseness	 of	 particulars	 into	 the	 “Wirklichkeitsdichte”	 or	
“density”	 of	 “a	 worldly	 reality.”11	 This	 is	 how	 it	 situates	 itself.	 This	 is	 how	 it	 effects	 an	
interpretive	self-localisation.	But	this	is	not	all.	The	interpretive	generalisation	of	particulars	
not	only	produces	the	world	in	which	the	interpretive	subject	finds	a	home,	it	also	produces	
the	 interpretive	 subject	 itself.	 Concomitantly	 to	 its	 production	 of	 world	 density	 or	





into	 view	 –	with	 little	 or	 no	 delay	 –	 the	 third	 characteristic	 of	 “enlarged	mentality”	 that	


















epistemology	of	 politics	 comes	 from	Kant.	 Sigwart	 nevertheless	makes	 sure	 that	Arendt’s	








of	 political	 understanding	 that	 reads	 like	 a	 page	 taken	 out	 of	 Gadamer’s	Wahrheit	 und	
Methode.14	That	Gadamer	may	well	be	a	ghost	writer	here	would	seem	to	be	confirmed	by	
Sigwart’s	characterisation	of	political	understanding	with	reference	to	Gadamer’s	notion	of	
Einrücken,	 that	 is,	 the	 ability	 to	meaningfully	 relate	 to	 the	 perspectives	 of	 others	 and	 to	






culminates	 in	 the	 hiatus	 of	 refugee	 status.	What	 Sigwart	 brings	 to	 our	 attention	with	 his	
meticulous	exposition	of	Arendt’s	epistemology	of	politics	concerns	much	more	than	a	mere	
epistemological	of	politics.	 It	also	concerns	 the	way	 in	which	politics,	understood	broadly,	
becomes	 fundamental	 epistemology;	 not	 only	 in	 Arendt’s	 work,	 but	 in	 the	 whole	
“hermeneutic	tradition,”	so	to	speak.	What	one	sees	him	describing	here,	with	reference	to	
Arendt,	 is	the	way	in	which	the	hermeneutic	or	linguistic	turn	in	philosophy	and	the	social	




common	 time	 and	 space	 that	 Kant’s	 Schematismuslehre	 attributed	 to	 the	 “schematising	
function”	of	transcendental	subjectivity.16	A	proper	grasp	of		this	hermeneutic	relocation	of	






Western	 politics.	 Lefort	 invoked	 the	 apparent	 “permanence”	 of	 the	 theologico-political	











the	 “permanence	 of	 the	 theologico-political”	 that	 the	 whole	 gamut	 of	 historical	 and	
interpretive	 narratives	with	which	 societies	 organise	 space	 and	 time	 and	 “the	 opening	 in	
which	it	is	hold,”	invariably	culminates	in	an	over-arching	theologico-political	narrative.	The	
over-arching	theologico-political	narrative	structures,	organises	and	secures	the	opening	in	
which	 societies	 are	 held.	 Now,	 it	 is	 this	 opening,	 the	 very	 opening	 of	 this	 opening,	 that	
suddenly	looms	large	again	when	refugee	status	commences.	It	suddenly	looms	large	because	























“hermeneutic	 situation.”18	 This	 “universality	 of	 the	 hermeneutic	 situation,”	 however,	








the	 evaporation	 of	 hermeneutic	 status,	 it	 would	 compel	 one	 to	 observe	 that	 an	 incisive	













and	 left,	 writes	 Yousif	 M.	 Qasmiyeh	 about	 the	 last	 moment	 before	 setting	 off	 into	 the	
unknown	 and	 unfamiliar.19	 It	 is	 the	 narrative	 schematising	 of	 time	 and	 space	 itself	 that	




























aimless	wanderings	of	 Israeli	 tribes	 in	 the	wilderness	or	by	the	adventures	and	dangers	which	befell	Aeneas	





them	here.	 It	 is	 rather	 towards	 renegade	moments	 that	precede,	and	possibly	precipitate	
revolutions	–	they	can	also	fail	to	do	so	–	to	which	the	thinking	of	the	hiatus	should	lean.	It	is	




















whom	 (or	what?)	 she	has	become,	 she	 faces	 the	ordeal	of	 a	double	 resistance	 to	any	 re-
familiarisation	 that	 may	 restore	 a	 world	 for	 her,	 her	 own	 resistance,	 and	 the	 world’s	
resistance.	First,	her	own	resistance:	Clawing	her	way	back	means	entering	the	ordeal	of	re-
familiarisation	 with	 unfamiliar	 soil	 and	 air;	 re-familiarisation	 that	 is,	 in	 fact,	 not	 strictly	
speaking	 a	 re-familiarisation,	 but	 a	 totally	 new	 familiarisation.	 It	 concerns	 a	 first	
familiarisation	with	unfamiliar	organisations	of	soil	and	air,	unfamiliar	schemas	of	time	and	





the	 world	 left	 behind.	 The	 first	 step	 of	 re-familiarisation	 is	 yet	 another	 step	 of	 de-
familiarisation.	
	
There	 is	 absolutely	 no	 reason	 to	 expect	 that	 the	 process	 of	 re-familiarisation	 would	 and	











































everything	 that	 life	 was	 until	 “the	 whole	 accident”	 occurred.	 Under	 these	 circumstances	
consistent	optimism,	optimism	that	is	not	the	“next	door”	neighbour	of	despair,	would	only	
signal	a	 lack	of	 real	 refugee	status.	 It	would	be	 the	sign	 instead,	of	 the	wanderlust	of	 the	
wayfarer,	adventurer	or	wanderer	for	whom	the	world	left	behind	is	not	truly	lost;	it	would	
be	 the	 sign	of	 one	 that	 is	 still	 relatively	 closely	 related	 to	 the	public	 figure	who	 ventures	
courageously	 into	 the	 world	 with	 the	 comforting	 knowledge	 that	 his	 home	 is	 intact	 and	
waiting	upon	him;	the	public	figure	of	whom	one	of	the	most	significant	passages	in	Arendt’s	
whole	oeuvre	speaks.27	 It	 is	 this	wanderer	that	Sigwart’s	rendition	of	Arendt’s	“wandering	






selfhood?	 How	 shall	 we	 assess	 the	 courage	 of	 one	 whose	 virtue	 is	 not	 reflected	 in	 the	

















adequately	 interpreted	world?	Where	 shall	one	 find	 the	 self	 for	whom	the	notion	of	 self-
localisation	remains	a	fiction	until	such	time	as	it	has	passed	through	an	act	comparable	to	
suicide,	passed	through	the	 last	act	of	de-localisation	without	which	re-localisation	cannot	






refugee	status	and	 the	passage	 to	a	new	world.	 If	 this	 resistance	could	be	 imagined	 for	a	
moment,	many	 other	 phenomena	 associated	with	 refugee	 and	 “immigrant”	 status	would	
become	 comprehensible	 in	 a	way	 that	 they	may	well	 not	 become	 otherwise.	We	 cannot	
interrogate	here	 the	highly	unstable	 and	 frequently	 fictitious	distinction	between	 refugee	
status,	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	different	kind	of	“immigrant”	status	on	the	other,	a	distinction	
that	 is	 often	 presented	 as	 one	 between	 “real	 refugees”	 and	 “economic	 refugees.”	 Let	 us	
simply	take	a	cue	from	a	typical	variety	of	societal	malaise	frequently	associated	with	both,	
namely,	the	unwillingness	and	inability	to	“integrate	socially.”	This	malaise	is	of	course	almost	















member	 to	 be	 excluded	 and	 persecuted,”	 wrote	 Arendt	 in	 “We	 refugees.”	 One	 should	
rephrase:	The	comity	of	European	peoples	went	to	pieces	because	of	its	apocalyptic	inability	
to	 recognise	 one	 of	 its	 members	 as	 a	 member.	 It	 is	 of	 course	 too	 early	 to	 say	 whether	
apocalypse	is	again	in	the	offing,	but	it	is	fair	to	observe	that	an	already	catastrophic	inability	
to	 recognise	 a	member	 as	 a	member	 is	 again	 signalling	 the	 real	 possibility	 that	 a	 certain	
Europe	 is	 coming	 to	 an	 end.	What	 may	 remain	 of	 “Europe”	 after	 this	 end,	 may	 well	 be	
unrecognisable	to	itself.	Europe’s	time	may	well	be	breaking,	as	it	has	done	so	often	before.	














And	 this	 European	 international	 law,	 argues	 Ayten	 Gündoğdu	 in	 an	 exquisite	 recent	
monograph	 on	 Arendt	 and	 international	 law,	 not	 only	 erases	 the	 difference	 between	
European	and	non-European	citizenship,	it	also	erases	the	distinction	between	citizenship	and	








key	 developments	 of	 international	 law	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century.	 She	begins	her	discussion	of	 this	 development	by	noting	how	Arendt	 considered	
human	rights	a	“stepchild	 [of]	nineteenth	century	political	 thought”	that	no	political	party	
took	seriously	then	and	was	still	not	being	taken	seriously	almost	fifty	years	into	the	twentieth	
century.	Humanitarian	 concerns	with	 violations	 of	 human	dignity	were	 still	 limited	 to	 the	






It	 is	 against	 the	 background	 of	 this	 framework	 of	 international	 law	 that	 The	 Origins	 of	
Totalitarianism	put	forward	the	enigmatic	concept	of	“a	right	to	have	rights.”30	In	an	essay	
published	almost	a	year	after	the	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UNDHR),	Arendt	
still	 bemoaned	 “the	 lack	of	 reality”	 of	 the	 rights	 articulated	 in	 the	Declaration.	 The	essay	
nevertheless	 acknowledged	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 “a	 crime	 against	 humanity”	
invoked	 by	 Justice	 Jackson	 during	 the	 Nuremberg	 trials.31	 Arendt	 recognised	 the	 right	 to	
asylum	as	the	only	significant	“symbol	of	the	rights	of	man”	in	international	law	in	The	Origin	
of	Totalitarianism,	but	contended	that	this	symbol	had	practically	been	abolished	because	of	
the	 pressures	 of	 massive	 statelessness	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 and	 the	
uncodified	status	of	this	right	in	both	international	treaties	and	national	constitutions.		The	














the	 UNDHR	 addressed	 the	 central	 problem	 of	 statelessness	 that	 Arendt	 raised	 in	 OT	 by	





birth	 or	 other	 status”	 (Art2.1	 ICCPR).33	 Gündoğdu	 observes	 in	 this	 regard	 the	 opinion	 of	
several	 commentators	 that	 the	 ICCPR	 renders	 the	 distinction	 between	 citizens	 and	 non-
citizens	insignificant	from	a	basic	rights	perspective.	Further	to	this,	article	26	of	the	ICCPR	











































or	 rather	 the	 “exclusion	of	 [a]	member”	 that	 the	 last	 lines	of	 “We	Refugees”	 invoke,	 is	 a	
question	that	will	stay	with	us	until	 the	end	of	this	paper.	 I	shall	ultimately	 insist	that	 it	 is	
indeed	a	case	of	non-recognition	that	is	at	stake	here,	for	reasons	that	I	will	articulate	then.	
From	a	 strictly	practical	or	 legal	perspective,	however,	 the	question	 is	ultimately	not	 that	
important.	 It	 is	evident	 that	 international	 law	 is	not	doing	what	 it	claims	to	be	doing.	 It	 is	
either	not	recognising	all	members	of	the	global	comity	of	peoples	as	members,	as	it	says	it	
is,	 or	 it	 is	 excluding	 some	members	 notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 are	 recognised	 as	
members.	
	
This	norm-practice	contradiction	 in	 international	 law	reflects	 the	other	 side	of	 the	double	
resistance	to	re-familiarisation	that	renders	an	effective	and	incisive	release	from	the	hiatus	
of	refugee	status	so	deeply	problematic	and	highly	unlikely.	The	refugee	not	only	needs	to	




argument.	 I	 nevertheless	wish	 to	 put	 up	 for	 reflection	one	more	 key	 contention	 that	 she	
makes.	Is	there	any	further	use	of	Arendt’s	enigmatic	invocation	of	“the	right	to	have	rights”	
against	 the	background	of	pervasive	positive	human	 rights	 law	 that	 is	belied	by	pervasive	









resonates	 significantly	 with	 the	 performativity	 on	 which	 Hans	 Kelsen’s	 supposedly	 “pure	
theory	of	law”	ultimately	depends,	as	I	argue	elsewhere.36	The	performativity	that	she	brings	















The	 extensive	 engagement	 above	with	 Sigwart’s	 and	Gündoğdu’s	 fine	 readings	 of	 Arendt	
seeks	to	extract	from	them	a	key	insight.	At	stake	in	their	work	is,	respectively,	two	concerns:	
1)	an	explanation	and	exposition	of	the	schematising	functions	with	which	twentieth	century	








of	knowledge.	To	put	 it	once	more	 in	the	terms	that	Sigwart	extracts	 from	Arendt’s	work:		





This	 being	 the	 case,	 it	 is	 well	 advisable	 to	 check	 from	 time	 to	 time	 how	well	 the	world-
constituting	 narratives	 are	 performing	 the	 task	 of	 integration	 that	 twentieth	 century	










During	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 this	 narrative	 deification	 of	 the	 state	 in	 Revolutionary	 and	
Enlightenment	discourses	was	replaced	by	a	conservative	Christian	human	rights	discourse,	
Samuel	Moyn	 tells	 us.37	 Putting	 all	 of	 this	 together,	 one	 can	 argue	 that	 the	discourses	 of	
international	 human	 rights	 law	 recount	 the	 theologico-juridical	 ordering	 of	 a	 common	
humanity	 with	 which	 twentieth	 century	 conservative	 Christian	 discourses	 replaced	 the	























the	 rule	 of	 law	 evidently	 get	 scrambled	 in	 a	 way	 that	 sucks	 everyone	 and	 everything	
concerned	 into	 a	 vortex	 devoid	 of	 space	 and	 time.	 The	 deep	 end	 of	 Arendt’s	 profound	
observation	at	the	end	of	“We	Refugees”	begins	to	meet	a	deeply	perplexed	gaze	here:	“The	






It	 is	 this	 abyssal	 narrative	 failure	 to	 which	 Gündoğdu’s	 invocation	 of	 the	 performative	
contradiction	of	human	rights	norms	alludes:	The	fundamental	performative	operation	that	




Early	 in	 her	 book,	 Gündoğdu	 expressly	 dissociates	 her	 fine	 critique	 of	 Arendt	 and	 of	
international	 human	 rights	 discourses,	 from	 Giorgio	 Agamben’s	 complete	 retreat	 from	



















human	 rights	 discourses	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 “navigat[ing]	 and	 reworking	 [their]	
perplexities.”	Hers	is	undoubtedly	a	complex,	admirable,	and	important	discourse	that	merits	




Arendt’s	 theoretical	 position,	 and	 she	 does	 so	 in	 a	 way	 that	 resonates	 firmly	 with	 the	
conception	of	critical	phenomenology	that	I	wish	to	put	forward	here.	Gündoğdu	writes:	
	





practices	 of	 human	 rights	 discourses	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 critical	 phenomenological	
mode	of	socio-political	inquiry.	
	





law	 circulating	 today.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 ban	 (that	 brings	 about	 the	
fundamental	 banning	 of	 sacred	 life	 from	 political	 life)	 pivots	 on	 the	 fundamental	
phenomenological	 insight	 into	 the	 way	 in	 which	 transcendental	 intentionality	 (the	
intentionality	that	constitutes	a	realm	of	consciousness)	performs	an	operation	of	inclusion	





elements	of	phenomenological	 thinking	 in	her	work	that	 I	examined	then.43	 I	shall	 instead	
















Merleau-Ponty	refers	repeatedly	and	extensively	 to	a	 fundamental	chiasm	and	fission	–	 le	
chiasme,	la	fission	fondamentale	–	in	his	work	Le	visible	et	l’invisible.47	What	is	at	stake	in	this	






to	 which	 La	 Phénoménologie	 de	 la	 Perception	 already	 refers	 as	 “the	 birth	 of	 history”	 or	
“history	in	the	state	of	its	birth”	-	l’histoire	à	l’état	naissant.48	Of	concern	here	is	the	earliest	
















informed	by	 this	 astonishment	of	 artists,	 poets,	 novelists	 and	phenomenologists	with	 the	
birth	of	history?	Sigwart	nevertheless	cautions	us	against	accepting	this	answer	too	quickly.	
The	 first	 chapters	 of	 his	 book	 are	 substantially	 dedicated	 to	 Arendt’s	 express	 wish	 to	






















and	 novelists.	 Sigwart’s	 description	 of	 Arendt’s	 theoretical	 self-localisation	 pays	 specific	
attention	 to	 her	 fascination	 with	 Kafka’s	 narrative	 localisation	 of	 the	 “thinking	 ego”	 in	 a	







located	 (or	 locates	 itself)	 outside	 the	 regular	 flow	 of	 time	 and	 current	 concerns.	 Arendt	
discerns	an	element	of	this	stepping	outside	the	current	of	time	and	current	affairs	in	her	own	










appropriate	 for	 herself	 and	 for	 political	 theory	 the	 wondering	 or	 thaumazein	 of	 the	
philosopher,	provided	 this	 thaumazein	 remains	 focussed	on	politics	 and	 the	affairs	of	 the	
city.54	Arendt’s	misgivings	about	the	philosophical	tradition’s	penchant	for	an	“individualising	
[and]	almost	isolating	experience”	of	wonderment	obviously	demands	some	reconsideration	
against	 the	 background	 of	 this	 concession	 that	 political	 theory	 is	 ultimately	 also,	 at	 least	






thaumazein	 –	 arguably	 even	 a	 step	 or	 two	 further	 out	 and	 away	 from	 the	 city	 than	
philosophical	thaumazein	–	must	return	to	the	world	of	common	human	affairs.	However,	
her	brief	concession	to	this	poetic	wondering	leaves	an	intriguing	trace	on	her	thinking,	or	at	
























irreducible	 breach	 in	 human	 affairs	 that	 no	 interpretive	 project	 can	 cover	 up	 or	 close.	




recognised	 in	 scholarly	engagements	with	her	 texts.	 This	 thought	 could	be	described	as	a	
concern	 with	 the	 two	 irreducible	 and	 irreconcilable	 trajectories	 that	 claim	 the	 human	
imagination,	 the	 trajectory	 that	 leads	 it	 down	 the	 reasonable	 path	 of	 collaborative	
constructions	of	common	worlds	that	ultimately	produce	law	and	the	orderly	freedom	that	





could	 then	argue	 further	 that	philosophy	and	political	 theory	 find	 themselves	 somewhere	
more	to	the	middle	of	the	spectrum,	philosophy	probably	somewhat	closer	to	poetry,	political	
theory	 probably	 somewhat	 closer	 to	 law.	 The	 theoretical	 endeavour	 that	 insistently	 and	
consistently	charts	both	these	trajectories	takes	both	these	trajectories	equally	seriously.	It	
engages	 in	 the	 creation	 and	 sustenance	 of	 common	 worlds	 that	 result	 from	 common	
hermeneutic	projects.	But	it	nevertheless	refuses	to	be	walled	up	behind	the	epistemological	
confinement	of	these	worlds.58	It	is	a	thinking	that	surely	takes	its	civil	responsibility	within	
















one	 opts	 for	 following	 her	 down	 the	 path	 opened	 up	 by	 the	 “poet’s	 careless	 political	















these	 links	 here?	Why	would	 one	 opt	 for	 stressing	 this	 nocturnal	 poetic	 side	 of	 Arendt’s	
thought?	Why	would	one	decide	to	respond	to	her	marginal	–	and	perhaps	only	 implicit	–	
recognition	of	poetry	as	a	retreat	from	the	domesticity	of	civil	politics,	instead	of	following	
her	 down	 the	 central	 line	 that	 runs	 through	 her	work,	 the	 trajectory	 of	which	 takes	 one	
straight	into	a	domiciling	domesticity	from	which	her	famous	distinction	between	the	private	













into	 absurdity,	writes	 Paul	 Celan:	 ...	 das	Gedicht	wäre	 somit	 der	Ort,	wo	 alle	 Tropen	 und	













the	 site	 of	 an	 extraordinary	 dispossession;	 the	 site	 of	 the	 most	 complete	 dispossession	
thinkable;	 the	 site	 of	 a	 dispossession	 that	 would	 certainly	 include	 the	 dispossession	 of	
domicile.	
	
	“Ce	 qu’il	 y	 a	 à	 saisir	 est	 un	 déposssession.”63	 That	 which	 needs	 to	 be	 grasped,	 is	 a	
dispossession,	wrote	Merleau-Ponty	in	a	singular	phrase	that	seems	to	echo	his	invocation	of	






























The	global	dispossession	of	national	 citizenships	 that	will	 allow	 for	 the	 standard	and	non-
exceptional	recognition	of	global	citizenship	is	an	unpoetic	fantasy.	It	is	an	unpoetic	fantasy,	



















no	 longer	does	 this,	 it	 simply	 falls	 silent	 and	 vacate	 the	 scene	of	 political	 and/or	 juridical	
contention,	either	to	allow	for	a	different	register	of	contention,	or	–	may	the	heavens	forbid	




































This	 paper	has	opted	 to	 articulate	 the	discourse/praxis	 discrepancy	with	 reference	 to	 the	
fundamental	exclusionary	operation	of	the	human	mind	that	the	phenomenological	tradition	
of	critical	inquiry	brings	to	one’s	attention.	Edmund	Husserl	already	analysed	the	way	in	which	
human	 intentionality	 is	 the	effect	of	Abschattungen,	 acts	or	 incidences	of	 shadowing	 that	
allows	 for	 the	 zone	 of	 illumination	 associated	 with	 intentionality.	 It	 is	 this	 incidence	 of	












function	 of	 the	 concept	 is	 to	 exclude	 and	 it	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 perform	 that	 function	
coherently	 if	 it	 is	 to	 inform	any	 kind	of	 praxis	 at	 all.	 The	 return	 to	 the	 excluded	must	 be	





the	 birth	 of	 all	 historical	 projects	 of	 hermeneutic	 generalisation	 and	 exclusion	 that	 soon	
enough	culminate	in	“bounded	forms	of	enlarged	mentality,”	as	Sigwart	calls	it,	the	birth	of	a	
concrete	 sensus	 communis	 of	 an	 actual	 political	 community	 as	 a	 “limited	 ‘space’	 with	
relatively	concrete	and	stable	boundaries.”71	It	is	the	birth	of	this	“limited	‘space’”	that	soon	
enough	also	facilitates	a	comprehensive	regime	of	property	and	“just”	entitlements.	One	may	
well	 ask	whether	 the	 birth	 of	 this	 limited	 space	 is	 not	 fundamentally	 conditioned	 by	 the	
motivation	 to	construct	a	 regime	of	property	and	entitlement,	but	 this	question	need	not	
detain	us	here.	Suffice	it	to	note	that	it	is	this	birth	of	limited	spaces	with	relatively	concrete	
boundaries	 and	 attendant	 property	 regimes	 that	 conditions	 refugee	 status.	 It	 is	 the	
precondition	 for	 refugee	 status.	 Refugee	 status	 depends	 on	 boundaries	 that	 effect	 an	
exclusion	and	registers	the	refugee	as	the	one	who	comes	from	the	outside.	
	
It	 is	 to	 the	 birth	 of	 this	 history	 or	 histories	 of	 “limited	 spaces”	 with	 “relatively	 stable	
boundaries”	to	which	phenomenology	returns,	according	to	Merleau-Ponty.	And	this	return	
to	history	 in	 its	state	of	birth	–	 this	 reversal	of	history	 that	 reaches	back	 into	the	deepest	
recesses	of	its	commencement	as	a	project	of	exclusionary	generalisation	and	distribution	of	
entitlements	 –	 is	 nothing	 but	 an	 act	 of	 dispossession,	 the	 most	 fundamental	 act	 of	
dispossession	possible.	“[S]aisir	le	sens	du	monde	ou	de	l'histoire	à	l'état	naissant”	is	nothing	
but	 “saisir	…	un	déposssession.”	 The	global	dispossession	of	national	 citizenships	 that	will	
allow	for	the	standard	and	non-exceptional	recognition	of	global	citizenship	demands	a	return	




language,	 a	 language	 that	 relentlessly	 retreats	 from	 all	 conceptual	 histories	 that	 secure	



















It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	Gündoğdu	 ultimately	 also	 comes	 around	 to	 acknowledge	 the	
necessity	of	the	return	to	the	hiatus.	As	shown	above,	Gündoğdu	expressly	opts	for	Arendt’s	





already	 stresses	 the	 “aporetic”	 nature	 of	 the	 “working	 through”	 she	 has	 in	 mind,	 with	
reference	to	Arendt’s	use	invocation	of	the	aporias	of	human	rights	in	the	German	translation	
of	OT:	 “Aporien	 der	Menschenrechten.”72	However,	 a	 strict	 reading	 of	 the	word	 “aporia”	
would	suggest	the	aporias	of	human	rights	actually	do	not	allow	one	any	way	through,	as	







that	 “ruptures	 the	 linear	 continuity	 of	 time.”74	 That	 is	 also	 how	 she	 comes	 to	 interpret	
Arendt’s	enigmatic	notion	of	“a	right	to	have	rights.”	According	to	her,	the	right	to	have	rights	
concerns	the	freedom	to	engage	in	the	constitutive	political	practices	through	which	human	












return	 to	 the	 abyssal	 commencement	 and	 recommencement	 on	which	 politics	 inevitably	
turns;	the	freedom	to	break	with	the	linear	continuation	of	the	past	and	to	recommence	with	
the	task	of	re-affirming	normative	commitments	that	one	knows	have	a	record	of	failure	and	
are	bound	to	 fail	again.	The	understanding	of	 this	performative	 re-inauguration	of	human	
rights	 –	 rupturing,	 as	 it	 does,	 the	 “linear	 continuity	 of	 time”	 is	 more	 insurrectional	 than	
revolutionary,	 as	Gündoğdu	 suggests	expressly	with	 reference	 to	Étienne	Balibar.76	 In	 this	







it,	even	the	mad	poet,	as	Foucault	would	have	 it.	 It	 is	doubtful	whether	Gündoğdu	would	
articulate	the	return	to	the	hiatus	in	this	way.	This	is	not	her	language,	and	it	also	need	not	
be	 her	 language.	 However,	 her	 acute	 description	 of	 the	 political	 freedom	 to	 re-affirm	
normative	ideals	that	have	failed	in	the	past	and	are	likely,	if	not	doomed,	to	fail	again,	takes	
an	 aesthetic	 or	 poetic	 turn	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 her	 book.	 This	 is	 already	 clear	 from	 her	




should	 also	 be	 noted	 that	 Gündoğdu’s	 engagement	 with	 Arendt	 also	 culminates	 in	 an	
extensive	discussion	of	her	essay	on	Kafka	“The	Jew	as	Pariah.”79	She	is	surely	not	unmoved	
by	the	“poetic	outside”	of	Arendt’s	thoughts	on	human	rights.	Be	it	as	it	may,	it	is	this	return	
to	 the	 hiatus	 of	 time	 through	 a	 return	 to	 poetic	 observations	 of	 “particularity”	 that	 the	





the	 language	of	 the	world	 to	describe	what	does	not	belong	 to	 the	world.	 Invocations	of	
“particularity”	does	not	suffice	here,	for	they	already	surreptitiously	invoke	universals	that	
“recognise”	the	particular	as	a	particular.	They	already	begin	“too	late.”	They	already	invoke	














This	 is	 the	 instruction	 we	 receive	 from	 Paul	 Celan’s	Meridian	 Rede.	 Celan	 refers	 to	 this	
timeless	hiatus	that	precedes	and	exceeds	time	as	a	“date.”	The	poet	endeavours	to	wrest	
from	 time,	 a	 unique	 and	 unrepeatable	 date.	 The	 poem	 is	 the	 endeavour	 to	 prevent	 the	
assimilation	of	the	date	in	and	by	the	flow	of	time.	The	poem	is	nothing	less	than	an	attempt	
to	pause	the	time	machine,	and	thus	to	observe	something	that	cannot	be	observed	from	the	







refugee’s	 journey	 through	 the	endless	dessert,	her	 flight	 from	the	al-Shabab	soldiers	who	
murdered	her	father	and	mother	and	the	father	of	her	own	children	in	front	of	her	eyes?81	
Who	will	describe	this	voyage	of	which	every	step	takes	her	further	and	further	away	from	
the	children	she	left	in	the	care	of	others	in	pursuit	of	the	mad	idea	that	Europe	might	one	
day	offer	them	an	escape	from	hell?	Perhaps	he	who	is	making	a	similar	journey	and	knows	
the	utter	recommencement	it	demands.	Yousif	M.	Qasmiyeh	writes:	“They	have	all	come	to	
re-originate	the	beginning	with	their	hands	and	feet.”82	
	
	
																																																						
80	See	Scott	Veitch,	“A	very	unique	case;	Reflections	on	Neil	MacCormick’s	Theory	of	Universalization	in	
Practical	Reasoning”,	in	Zenon	Bankovski	and	James	Maclean,	eds.,	The	Universal	and	the	Particular	in	Legal	
Reasoning	(Aldershot:	Ashgate,	2006)	143-158.	(footnote	incomplete).	
81	This	is	the	story	of	a	young	woman	who	was	found	sleeping	under	a	bridge	in	Metz	before	she	was	taken	in	
to	the	“Welcome”	programme	of	the	local	Caritas	organization.	
82	Yousif	M.	Qasmiyeh,	“Vis-à-Vis	or	A	Camp,”	in	Writing	the	Camp,	
https://refugeehosts.org/2016/09/30/writing-the-camp/.	I	am	again	indebted	to	Lyndsey	Stonebridge’s	
references	to	this	poem	in	her	paper	“We,	the	Refugees:	Hannah	Arendt	in	Baddawi,”	(fn.	19)	above.	
